VZCZCXRO3246 RR RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHMR RUEHRN DE RUEHTO #0965/01 2400819 ZNY CCCCC ZZH R 280819Z AUG 09 FM AMEMBASSY MAPUTO TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0645 INFO RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0463 RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0185 RUEHAN/AMEMBASSY ANTANANARIVO 0041 RUEHPL/AMEMBASSY PORT LOUIS 0546 RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MAPUTO 000965

SIPDIS

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TAGS: PGOV PREL MZ MA

SUBJECT: RAVALOMANANA CAMP APPEALS FOR USG STATEMENT

REF: A. ANTANANARIVO 604

- ■B. ANTANANARIVO 596
- ¶C. ANTANANARIVO 589
- **1**D. MAPUTO 960
- ¶E. MAPUTO 896

Classified By: A/DCM Matthew Roth, Reasons 1.4(b+d)

(C) Mauritian High Commissioner Georges Alain Laridon called the Embassy on August 27 to say that Prega Ramsamy, Special Advisor to deposed Malagasy President Marc Ravalomanana, wanted to pass a message to the USG. Ramsamy, a Mauritian national and former SADC Executive Secretary, told PolOff late that same evening that the Maputo II talks had stalled on the central issue of the presidency of the transitional government. According to Ramsamy, Ravalomanana's camp cannot agree to have Rajoelina as President, as it would be acknowledging and validating a coup, and runs against the will of the Malagasy people. He also asked the USG to make a public statement in support of constitutional democracy and to consider cancelling trade preferences with Madagascar.

ANYONE BUT RAJOELINA

12. (C) In the August 27 meeting, Ramsamy passed PolOff a written statement (sent via email to AF/E, AF/S and Embassy Antananarivo) by Ravalomanana addressed to all in attendance at the Maputo II negotiations stating that the deposed president agreed not to personally participate in the management of the transition; however, the will of the Malagasy people should be respected, and the presidency of the transitional government should return to the Ravalomanana movement. Ramsamy and other advisors told PolOff that Ravalomanana would be willing to back down from this demand however, and would accept "anyone but Rajoelina" at the head of the transitional government.

FRENCH MEDDLING

 $\P3$. (C) Ramsamy also called on the United States to make a public statement on Madagascar in support of a return to constitutional democracy in Madagascar. He said that Ravalomanana expressed grave concerns about the continued French presence in the corridors of the Maputo II talks, and stating that an unnamed French representative from Quai d'Orsay at the talks was putting extreme pressure on the Ratsiraka, Zafy, and Ravalomanana movements to accept Rajoelina as the president of the transitional government. Ambassador Laridon also claimed to PolOff of "French

meddling" in Malagasy affairs, referencing French support of the military coup which installed Rajoelina. Ramsamy suggested that a public U.S. statement would counterbalance private French pressure in support of Rajoelina.

STOP AGOA, PRESSURE RAJOELINA

14. (C) Ramsamy said that Ravalomanana also urged the United States to halt AGOA trade preferences, as AGOA would only prop up the French-supported Rajoelina regime. Ramsamy argued that ending AGOA benefits to Madagascar would serve to level the playing field and put significant pressure on Rajoelina to compromise with the other parties in the "Big Four." PolOff indicated to Ramsamy that these messages would be conveyed to Washington, but reiterated that doing so should not be seen as tacit agreement with Ravalomanana, s position or support for his requests.

COMMENT: MAURITIANS ALLIGNED WITH RAVALOMANANA

15. (C) As of midnight on August 27, the Malagasy parties in the Maputo II talks had not agreed to the key issue of the presidency of the transitional government. The Ravalomanana camp with its Mauritian backers appear to be keenly interested in counter-balancing French pressure to reach a compromise. All sides seem to think that a successful resolution of the issue of the presidency would likely mean

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the return of international aid flows to Madagascar--albeit strengthening the position of whichever party controls the transitional government. In any case, Ravalomanana's advisors appeared pessimistic that such an agreement could be reached.

CHAPMAN